Listen in as Aviation Week editors discuss the GAO's recent report on the F-35 and explain what's hampering the now $2 trillion program.
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Transcript
Robert Wall:
Welcome everyone to Aviation Week's Check 6 podcast. Today we look at where things stand with the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter that, by the latest Government Accountability Office numbers, has ballooned into a $2 trillion U.S. program over its projected service life.
The F-35 is, depending on whom you talk to, a massive failure or a huge success. But no matter where you fall on that spectrum, one thing is clear. It has been a hot seller overseas even while it's still very much a work in progress.
Here to help unpack all this for you are Steve Trimble, Aviation Week's defense editor, and Tony Osborne, our London bureau chief. I'm Robert Wall, Aviation Week's executive editor for defense and space.
Steve, let me start with you. The GAO recently released another F-35 report with new details on some of the problems developing the latest updates, the TR-3, and other issues. Strikingly to me, the GAO said Lockheed Martin delivered 91% of aircraft late last year, and Pratt & Whitney, the engine contractor, did not deliver any engines on time over that period. But Steve, I'm curious, what was your main takeaway from the GAO report?
Steve Trimble:
Well, so the GAO has been critical throughout the life of the F-35 program about how it's being managed by the Program Office, but this one was particularly critical, and there's some really interesting new details about some of the things that they're up against right now.
To break this down, it's important to understand there are two specific upgrade paths that are being discussed here. One is the Technology Refresh 3, which adds a new integrated core processor, it's basically a modern supercomputer that they're putting in the aircraft. And then there's the Block 4 modernization. And you can't get Block 4 modernization without Technology Refresh or TR-3, TR-3.
And with Block 4, you're going to get a new radar, for just the U.S. customers, actually the APG-85, which is going to replace the APG-81. The international customers will stay with the APG-81. You're also getting a much more powerful EW system, so instead of just eight receivers, you're getting 20 receivers. I mean, it's going to be this antenna farm on the aircraft, essentially. And a lot of different new munitions, both U.S. and foreign.
So all that's coming, but it's late, right? So the TR-3 was supposed to be delivered, the new hardware with the first version of the Block 4 software, in July of last year. And that didn't happen. It's still being certified in test. And since July, the Joint Program Office has refused to accept delivery of any new F-35 aircraft coming off the line without that certification. So Lockheed has continued building F-35s at the same rate, so there's dozens if not over a hundred F-35s have been built that have gone straight into storage since that July timeframe.
And so now we're getting this GAO report that says, well, kind of good news in a way is that they're actually going to start delivering TR-3 equipped F-35s supposedly in June. Essentially, this month. So that's kind of good except for the fact that these aircraft with this TR-3 equipment will be using limited software. So probably only training coded software, not combat coded software. No new capabilities that were supposed to be introduced with that first version of Block 4 will be included. And that software won't be finally certified now, according to this GAO report, until at least 2025. So now we're talking at least a two-year delay for that TR-3 capability with the initial version of Block 4.
So that's a problem. But then it also talks about how there's going to be some knock-on costs. There's some issues with the APG-85 AESA development. That's a very classified program so we don't know a whole lot about it. We actually don't understand how it got included in Block 4. It was only acknowledged a couple years ago.
And it also warns that there's right now a review underway within the program, this GAO report is talking about this for the first time, saying that the Program Office is considering deferring some of the big Block 4 upgrades that depend on the separate track of thermal management and engine thrust and power upgrades that are also being funded on a separate track, those aren't going to be delivered until 2030 or 2032, in that timeframe. So that review is talking about not deferring those Block 4 capabilities that depend on those infrastructure upgrades in the jet until those are ready.
Robert Wall:
Really what it sounds like, you don't have one takeaway. It seems like a whole cascading sequence of events that are unfolding here. Engine issues, software issues that are causing the Block 4, which is really what the user's really interested in, to be a couple years late.
Steve Trimble:
And we knew that there were some issues, some underlying issues, but this report seems to indicate that there are some metastasizing problems that are cascading through the development of Block 4 and potentially deferring significant capabilities for several years. Now, you still get TR-2, the aircraft equipped with TR-2 avionics, and that version of the computer is flying today. There's over 990 delivered. It's been in combat. They've been flying it a lot. So you still have what you've got with the F-35, but these Block 4 upgrades, which were considered essential for how the U.S. views its role in this great power competition struggle with China, those won't be coming potentially for several years now.
Robert Wall:
Great, thanks. And thanks for alluding to being operated right now, because the Israelis of course are flying the jet and they seem to be happy with it, with at least some of what we're hearing.
But let me kick it over to Tony. Talk a bit more generally about the F-35 and really what's happening overseas, both in terms of what the delays may mean for the customers, and then also more generally how it's doing.
Tony Osborne:
Yeah, thanks Robert. Just to point out that Israel is flying the aircraft over Gaza, but in an environment where they're not really contested, so they're not really using the full capabilities of the airplane. There's obviously been a lot of concern here in Europe. There are several nations that depend on deliveries of F-35 to replace the F-16 that's long been serving for the past 40 years. And there are air forces here that will be completely dependent on the F-35. So as they take delivery of TR-2 aircraft or F-3 standard or whatever it is that we're calling it at the moment, these aircraft are essentially free-fall bombers, they're not capable of really doing the denied environment if the flag goes up tomorrow.
And there is a war here in Europe. We are constantly facing the threat of a Russian... You know, the Russian specter. If you go to the Baltic states and the Scandinavian area, those real fear of what could come next. And hence these aircraft are essential to the modernization of European air forces, and frankly, they're not arriving on time. So countries like Denmark are concerned that they're not getting a single standard of aircraft across their fleet. They're taking early deliveries of the current standard, but were really hoping to have TR-3 in place so that they could have a standardized fleet. Same for Belgium. They are sort of holding off deliveries. The aircraft that they are taking place will probably be used for
training in the States. Which will of course help, but of course it all depends on when Lockheed Martin can get the TR-3 system into service.
So there's some real challenges from the European air forces. They are not like the massive U.S. Air Force, which can rely on numerous types. They will be entirely dependent on the F-35. Norway has already made that transition, for example. The Netherlands will make that transition this August when the last F-16s have withdrawn.
Robert Wall:
Tony, before we started, you were kind of making an interesting point that it's not just a future problem, there are some real-world today implications. Talk about that a bit.
Tony Osborne:
Exactly. So if the flag goes up here in Europe tomorrow, these aircraft are essentially bombers that will be going up against very advanced surface-to-air missile systems. We were supposed to be getting standoff weapons for these aircraft, but they're all part of the TR-3 upgrade. So weapons like AARGM-ER, as I understand it, are part of the TR-3 upgrade. And several European nations are going down that route, buying AARGM-ER for the suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses role. Of course, if TR-3 is not available, that weapon is not available to them either.
And of course, this is also a problem for nations that want their own sovereign weapons to be included on the aircraft. So the UK is particularly frustrated. We were supposed to be getting the MBDA Spear 3 and Meteor beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile on the aircraft around now, going by the milestones that were set when the contracts were signed in the mid-2010s. The British government is now saying they're not expecting those capabilities well out until just before 2030 at the earliest.
And that's quite a troubling thing. You've got Meteor, which is going to be a weapon that goes further than AMRAAM, and a weapon that's being widely demanded by nations as Russia makes use of long-range air-to-air missiles from Su-25 and MiG-31. They want a weapon that can outrange that. Meteor can do that. It's not available on the fifth generation fighter of choice across Europe. So that's a deeply frustrating omission. And the RAF air chief himself has sort of said he really wants Spear 3 right now because it's a small weapon, gives the aircraft a lot of combat persistence because it can carry eight of them in the low observability mode of the aircraft. And that is not currently available and may not be for another sort of three, four, five years because of these delays. So it is deeply troubling.
And of course the other problem is that this has a kickback. If nations aren't getting the F-35s, it means that they can't replace their older aircraft, which means those air forces are less relevant. In the case of those nations that are handing F-16s to Ukraine, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, if those countries have to wait longer for F-35, Ukraine may have to wait longer for its F-16s, further delaying the conflict.
Robert Wall:
Steve, how is this all going down in the U.S.? How is Congress reacting to all this?
Steve Trimble:
Sure. And actually just to make one further point to what Tony was saying, the kinetic weapon delays are a concern broadly, even in the U.S. but also overseas, but there are some non-kinetic capabilities on the aircraft today. When I talk to the U.S. Air Force and some of the pilots, I think they're very confident that they can rely on those non-kinetic options that are on the jet today to deal with the suppression of enemy of air defense mission. That seems to be the sort of prevailing mood. They can't go into any
details and I don't know them, but that is something to at least think about in the near term. So I mean they're not denuded of SEAD capability, or suppression of enemy air defense capability, in the interim possibly.
But the way Congress is looking, I mean, Congress has been broadly supportive of the F-35 over the years. When DoD has not adequately funded procurement, Congress has always come in and added F-35s. Actually, in the last couple of years, they stopped doing that. But now they're really trying to put the JPO's feet to the fire as well as Lockheed's feet to the fire to get some of these programs fixed, and fast.
I should caveat this because House Armed Services Committee passed their version of the National Defense Authorization Act, and I won't go through the entire U.S. budgetary process, but that's just one step. It still has to be passed by the full House, and Senate has their version, which may or may not include this language. There's also the appropriations track. So this is just an indication at this point of how the Armed Services Committee in the House is feeling about this. It may or may not lead to a final bill, even if that ever gets passed at the end of the year.
With that in mind, just as a sense of Congress, they're saying, "Okay, if you don't get some of these things fixed, we are going to limit delivery of F-35s, starting in 2025, to a total of 48 aircraft across all three U.S. services." Now, that doesn't affect international orders or deliveries, obviously, but for the U.S. side, just 48 total. Now, 48 is the U.S. Air Force sort of annual commitment to the program. They wanted to buy a whole lot more than that, but in recent years, the maximum has been 48.
So this would significantly limit deliveries of the F-35 in the interim unless they do certain things, one of which is buy a new cooperative avionics test bed, a CATBird. Now, this has been something I've been asking about with the program for several months. They used to have what they called a CATBird during the system development and demonstration phase. Once that was completed in 2018, they parked that aircraft, and they didn't replace it as they moved into Block 4.
And that became kind of relevant when we heard General Schmidt, the director of the JPO, say in a congressional hearing in December that he's got a problem right now with trying to test and certify the Block 4 software on the TR-3 hardware. And what he's saying is... Lockheed has that software. They put it into their ground-based system integration lab. It comes out. And it may have some glitches in it or it may be fine, but they know what they are, they know what those issues are. And then they put it in the jet and the jet goes flying and the software behaves completely differently in that flying real-world environment where it's interacting with the actual hardware in flight in that high vibration, high thermal environment type of experience.
That points to the reason why they had the CATBird in the first place, which was to simulate exactly the hardware and the software together on a flying aircraft that wasn't an F-35. They sort of host... They take another aircraft and they host all these systems, including the control surfaces on the aircraft, to simulate that environment and to get as much realism as possible in the testing before they send it to the F-35 test fleet.
So they don't have that, and they're saying... So this bill, if it's passed, would authorize the JPO to acquire a test bed, a CATBird, but even if they were to do that, this bill wouldn't get passed until the end of 2024. The appropriations committees also would have to pass something similar to give them the actual money to spend on this. And then it would take a couple of years to actually acquire the aircraft, modify the aircraft, get it certified, and start testing it. So this is not going to fix any problems in the short term while they're trying to get through this sort of crisis in the TR-3 delivery delays.
So yeah, there's a lot of remediations built into this report, but there's no short-term fixes. These are all for long-term, addressing these issues in the long-term.
Robert Wall:
Right. Tony, it's interesting, isn't it? Because we've been talking a lot on some of the European programs how much of focus there is now on having flying test beds for their next generation, and it seems like a real lesson.
Tony Osborne:
That's a very good point, Robert. The UK, Japan, Italian GCAP program will use a Boeing 757 to test those avionics. In an upcoming article ahead of Farnborough, I think we'll reveal that there's going to be the use of the French Fokker 100 test bed to test the FCAS avionics for the Franco-German-Spanish program. And actually Turkey is planning to use a Global Express business jet for testing of the Kaan.
Just going back on the F-35 issues, it still amazes me that even with all these issues, this airplane is still going to be the preeminent fighter of Europe and it is still selling in Europe. Romania is on the cusp of buying the airplane. Greece will shortly buy it. And of course, numerous other countries already have those procurements set in motion. The likes of Switzerland, Germany, Poland will receive its first aircraft in August, and Czech Republic too, although it'll be waiting quite a while. And of course we'll have to keep its Saab Gripens going for a bit longer. And of course, some of those delays could start gathering and countries may have to wait longer, of course.
Robert Wall:
Yeah, there's so much to unpack on this program. But I don't want to leave it entirely before we briefly talk about a former colleague of ours, Bill Sweetman, who wrote a new pamphlet on the F-35. And interesting, obviously he's changed his tune a bit or his mind a bit on the program. Originally it was... Or 20 years ago he wrote about the Ultimate Fighter, and now he's kind of soured on that a bit. Steve, you just got done reading, what, the Trillion Dollar Trainwreck, I think it is. Any takeaways from your end?
Steve Trimble:
Well, I mean, yes. The context is... I mean, a year ago, Tom Burbage, the former program manager for Lockheed, he left in 2013, but he co-authored a book about the F-35 that covered the development issues, but still there was a firm conclusion that everything was worth it and that the program was a strategic success for the U.S. as well as for Lockheed. But Bill Sweetman has now come out with his sort of rebuttal to that. It's not quite a book. It's 75 pages. I don't know if you'd call that a book. It's sort of formatted more like a think tank report. That's how I read it. But he takes the opposite conclusion, that it's been a strategic failure. He argues that it's hollowed out the U.S. Air Force tactical combat capability by not delivering in the quantities and in the quality that was expected when the program, and certainly at the cost and schedule that wasn't envisioned originally.
And he brings up some interesting points also about just sort of the historic requirements and how they got set, just how the length and wingspan of the aircraft were set by these sort of artificial constraints that no longer exist. A great example he points out was the HMS Invincible had a 56 foot long mid-deck hangar elevator to bring the aircraft up. So that constrained the length of the aircraft to no more than 56 feet. And of course, all the F-35s are in that sort of 51, 52 feet length regime. Well, the Invincible was retired 13, 14 years ago, I think. the HMS Queen Elizabeth second is now out and it's got this 85 foot or something long mid-deck hangar elevator, but of course the F-35 length is still constrained at 51 feet. It's an issue of fineness ratio, as Bill Sweetman points out. So it's things like that that I think really illuminate some sort of fundamental decisions and architectural decisions that were made that complicated things down the road.
That said, when I finished it, I was still hoping for a lot more, and I hope that there's... You know, we've had Tom Burbage's book. He co-authored that with a few other people. And now Bill Sweetman's sort of rebuttal to that. But I think we need something more. I would love to see a truly academic treatise on what this program is, what it means, how it got here, and how hopefully we can avoid some of these issues that keep popping up with the F-35 no matter how long the program exists. I mean, it got into deep trouble in its first decade, culminating in 2010 where it looked like the program is on the chopping block even. Ash Carter wrote in his memoir about potentially walking out or actually walking out of a meeting with the CEO of Lockheed out of just frustration. Maybe even thinking about canceling the program.
But then they bring in Vice Admiral Venlet from the Navy. He kind of stabilizes it. Bogdan comes in, Lieutenant General Bogdan from the Air Force came into the JPO after that. And really that's where we started seeing it kind of really stabilize and kind of moving in the other direction, sort of a positive direction. They pulled off this really impressive production ramp-up, up until 2019. And things seemed to be going in the right direction. But then they moved into the Block 4 modernization program. And obviously COVID hit the supply chain, so we've seen production take a beating since then. And new cost increases, new development problems, new capability shortfalls, all hit the Block 4 program. So we're sort of in this downward trajectory for the program, except in the area of sales. And it's not clear when we're going to get out of this.
Robert Wall:
Right. So the F-35 is suffering from a case of long COVID.
Well, let's leave it there. We could talk about this program forever. Thanks, Steve. Thanks, Tony. Thanks so much. Let's wrap this episode of Check 6. A special thanks to our podcast editor in London, Guy Ferneyhough. And a big thank you, of course, to our audience for your time. And don't miss the next episode of Check 6. So follow us on Apple, Spotify, or wherever else you get your podcast, and we hope you'll tune in again next week for another episode of Check 6.
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