Reagan National Midair Collision Probe Spotlights FAA Risk Analysis

New restrictions near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport have eliminated the risk of another midair collision similar to January’s accident involving a regional jet and a U.S. Army helicopter. Investigators and the FAA are still piecing together why such risk persisted for years despite warning signs and whether other precursors were missed.

The NTSB in a March 11 safety recommendation letter called on the FAA to prohibit helicopter operations east of National Airport (DCA) along a section of helicopter Route 4 when the airport’s secondary runway, Runway 15/33, is in use. The board also recommended that the FAA designate an alternate helicopter route when 15/33 is in use. The NTSB labeled both recommendations “urgent” and suggested that the FAA work with stakeholders, notably the Defense Department, to develop safe alternatives. The FAA, which had issued temporary restrictions soon after the accident through March 31, immediately accepted the recommendations.

• NTSB probe leads to restrictions around Washington National Airport
• Warning signs had long pointed to risks posed by helicopters
• The FAA is using AI to detect similar patterns at other airports

“The existing separation distances between helicopter traffic operating on Route 4 and aircraft landing on Runway 33 are insufficient and pose an intolerable risk to aviation safety,” NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy said in a March 11 briefing.

Route 4 runs along the Potomac River’s east bank and crosses the arrival end of Runway 33 at about 200 ft. above the river, or within 75-100 ft. of where an inbound aircraft should be (see diagram). This location is where American Eagle Flight 5432, a Bombardier/MHIRJ CRJ-700, and the Sikorsky UH-60L Black Hawk, call sign PAT-25, collided on Jan. 29 as the regional jet was on final approach to Runway 33. The collision occurred at 8:48 p.m. local time, in the dark. All 64 occupants on the regional jet and three on the helicopter were killed.

The Route 4-Runway 33 intersection is the only area around DCA where approved helicopter routes and conventional airways fly this close together. The minimal separation is a worst-case safety margin and was never meant to support simultaneous operations. But an NTSB examination of pilot reports and other incident data shows that the risks of mixing helicopters and commercial aircraft near DCA extends well beyond the midair collision location.

The NTSB review found that from 2011 through 2024, commercial aircraft received an average of one traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS) resolution advisory (RA) per month due to conflicts with helicopters near DCA. Most of these incidences happened during approaches, and two-thirds occurred at night. Many of these conflicts involved helicopters flying higher than authorized.

RAs are TCAS’ last line of defense. An RA signals an imminent collision and provides commands—such as “climb,” “level off,” “descend”—for pilots to maintain separation from another aircraft.

Investigators found that commercial aircraft and helicopters came within 1 nm laterally and 400 ft. vertically about 15,200 times in 974,000 total operations from October 2021 through December 2024. On 85 occasions, the separations were less than 1,500 ft. laterally and 200 ft. vertically. “There clearly were indicators where safety trending could have occurred,” Homendy said.

“Why this information wasn’t studied and known before Jan. 29 is an important question,” Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy said in a March 11 briefing in response to the NTSB recommendations. “But based on that information and this crash, we are going to continue with our restrictions.”

The restrictions, which go beyond the NTSB recommendations, effectively ban all nonessential helicopter traffic on Route 4 from Hains Point, 0.6 nm east of the airport, to the Wilson Bridge, 2.8 nm due south of the airport. If essential operations, such as active first responders or air defense missions, are required, all commercial traffic—notably, flights in and out of DCA—must pause. Use of visual separation air traffic control (ATC) protocol will be limited to certain helicopter operators. The FAA issued its temporary bans, which expire on March 31, and said it would wait for input from the NTSB based on the investigation. The new, permanent restrictions were slated to be codified in a Notice to Airmen, or NOTAM, within days, Duffy said.

The secretary acknowledged that the FAA’s lack of action before the collision needs to be examined. “I think the question is, ‘When this data comes in, how did the FAA not know?’” Duffy said. “How do they not study the data to say, ‘Hey, this is a hot spot. We’re having near misses, and if we don’t change our way, we’re going to lose lives.’ That wasn’t done.”

How the FAA responded to the incident reports will be one of the NTSB’s primary focus areas as its investigation expands. Events that trigger RAs fall under the FAA’s category of occurrences that require formal reports and evaluations. The FAA’s Air Traffic Organization has a safety management system that lays out specific protocols for investigating incidents and evaluating risks. Several FAA orders codify the process for FAA employees.

Voluntary reports, such as entries in NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System—including dozens of records that recount occurrences between aircraft and helicopters around National Airport—are considered unverified data and are not automatically escalated for review (AW&ST Feb. 10-23, p. 16). However, individuals involved can file formal reports.

But the formal reporting of an event does not ensure that it goes through a prescribed risk analysis process. If an occurrence does not meet specific thresholds, such as two aircraft coming within a certain proximity or obvious mistakes by front-line workers, it may not receive additional scrutiny. “It’s not out of the realm of possibility that [these reports] just didn’t go any further,” one source with ATC experience tells Aviation Week.

Duffy said the FAA has adopted a proactive approach to flagging air traffic risks, starting at airports that, like DCA, have significant transiting traffic mixed with departures and arrivals. The agency is using artificial intelligence (AI) to analyze traffic patterns at a dozen airports in eight cites with charted helicopter routes, Duffy said. Plans call for expanding AI monitoring nationwide within weeks, he added.

“A lot of information comes, and it’s hard to parse through it,” Duffy said. “AI will help us look at it and see what information we can draw from it to make changes moving forward.”

The FAA said it is “using machine learning and language modeling to scan incident reports and mine multiple data sources to find themes and areas of risk.”

The changes to DCA’s airspace and analysis of other airports had industry backing before Duffy’s announcement. “We support permanently suspending those helicopter flights around DCA with certain exceptions,” Airlines for America President Nick Calio told lawmakers during a March 4 House aviation subcommittee hearing on ATC staffing and safety. “We also think that helicopters around other major airports that are busy should be reevaluated and looked at for permanent change.”

National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) President Nick Daniels offered no specifics on the accident, citing the association’s status as a party, or designated participant, in the NTSB probe. But he cautioned that safety-related procedural changes, such as traffic bans, should be based on collaborative analysis of specific risks.

“It is imperative that we remember that we have safety processes in place today, and we have a local safety council that deals not only at DCA but across the entire National Airspace System,” Daniels told the subcommittee. “It’s imperative that the FAA and NATCA continue to work. That way, we can make that determination at the local level of what the safest approach is, rather than rote mandates.”

The decision to ban helicopter flights following the accident was made based on safety council input, he suggested. “Right after that accident was [an example of] working together to implement change in temporary procedures because we had this process in place,” Daniels said.

Former NATCA President Paul Rinaldi suggested that while a collaborative approach can be effective, the FAA needs to act more quickly to mitigate known risks. “That area where the accident happened is a known conflict area,” Rinaldi told lawmakers. “It’s been a known conflict area for years. The FAA should look at these known conflict areas and deconflict them so we don’t have to worry about [them].”

The NTSB recommendations stem from the ongoing probe. A preliminary report on the investigation released along with the recommendations adds some new details about the accident sequence. Investigators concluded that both aircraft had illuminated their routine navigation and collision lights. The CRJ also had its right- and left-wing landing lights and upper and lower beacon lights on, the report added. None of the aircraft’s lights were LEDs.

The helicopter’s active lights included the left, right and tail pylon position lights, the report said.

The CRJ crew received one aural TCAS traffic advisory (TA), 19 sec. before the collision, at a radio altitude of about 850 ft. The UH-60L was 0.95 nm away, the report said. TCAS RAs are inhibited below 900 ft., while aural TAs cease below 400 ft.

Detailed altitude data on the helicopter is still being compiled, Homendy said. Details verified so far indicate that the helicopter was above 200 ft.—the collision occurred at about 300 ft.—and investigators are still working to determine why.

A review of communications between the local controller in DCA’s tower and both crews confirms that the controller and the Black Hawk crew twice exchanged messages about the inbound CRJ. Both times, someone in the helicopter confirmed having the aircraft in sight and requested visual separation, which was granted. This effectively made the helicopter responsible for ensuring separation, although controllers can always intervene.

Investigators determined that key parts of messages from the controller to the helicopter did not get through, which could help explain why the UH-60L crew seemingly never saw the CRJ-700 regional jet, despite assuring controllers they had the correct aircraft in sight.

One instruction, issued about 2 min. before the accident, informed the helicopter pilots that the CRJ—5.5 nm away at the time—was in the area. The controller provided the jet’s approximate location and altitude as well as a note that it would be changing course from its Runway 1 arrival and “circling to Runway 33” for its approach, a switch that meant the regional jet would intersect Route 4.

“[Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR)] data from the Black Hawk indicated that the portion of the transmission stating the CRJ was circling may not have been received by the Black Hawk crew,” Homendy said during a Feb. 14 media briefing. “We hear the word ‘circling’ in ATC communications, but we do not hear the word ‘circling’ on the CVR of the Black Hawk.”

Then, just 17 sec. before the collision, the controller told the Black Hawk crew to pass behind the CRJ, which was coming from the southbound Black Hawk’s east, or left, side as it approached Runway 33. But the helicopter crew apparently did not receive the key “pass behind” part of the message.

“Data from the Black Hawk indicated that the portion of the transmission that stated ‘pass behind the’ may not have been received by the Black Hawk crew because someone keyed a microphone to communicate with the controller,” Homendy said. “The transmission was stepped on by an 0.8-sec. mic key from the Black Hawk.”

In a follow-up response 2 sec. later, a Black Hawk pilot told the other crewmembers that ATC wanted them to move left, toward the Potomac’s east bank.

Information released by the board includes no evidence of messages to the American crew about the Black Hawk or any other helicopter traffic.

The confusion increases the spotlight on communications between ATC and the pilots. Both the CRJ and the Black Hawk were using VHF communication channels, but they were different—one was dedicated to airport arrivals and departures, and one was for helicopter traffic. In that scenario, although both crews could hear everything the controller communicated, they could not hear each other. Investigators will look closely at how this could have affected the pilots’ situational awareness.

An NTSB review of DCA tower controller staffing on the day of the accident found that the local controller and helicopter controller positions were combined, or handled by one controller, at 3:40 p.m.—about 5 hr. before the accident. A second controller was also working two positions: flight data and clearance delivery. Three other controllers were on duty working single positions: assistant local control, ground control and operations supervisor. Four additional controllers were in the facility but not on duty at the time of the accident, Homendy said.

Such staffing was not uncommon, the experienced ATC source says. The flight data and clearance delivery roles are usually handled by one controller. The helicopter control position will often be combined if rotary-wing traffic is light. Assigning it to the local controller responsible for the runways maximizes situational awareness.